If Zionists would not wish to be a “Curse on Humanity”?
Let’s explore how it became a State in the first place. We can even go past the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and how that was a “Backstab to Germany” and a “Deal With The Devil” for Britain to enter into. Well past the point that Germany had basically won WWI, at the point it was submitted, and it was agreed to and implemented by hoodwinking, and a “False Flag” of the Lucitania. Germany ended up losing WWI ONLY because of the Balfour Declaration and it’s promise to bring the United States into this War to win it for Britain, by Zionist Hoodwinking and Control of USA Elite, in exchange for Britain to give the Zionists (in return) Palestine in return (which the British did not own at the time), and we can just pretend that all never happened, if we wanted.
We could overlook that it was Zionist Hoodwinking that got both Britain and France to push Germany into WWII. We could wash the fact that Germany beat both the British and French after that, and that the War should have ended in 1940, saving Millions upon Millions of lives, had the Zionists not been adamant about Churchill not accepting any German Peace Proposals. We could wash that.
We could even wash the fact that the “Holocaust Fraud” used by Zionists to justify the beginning of the State of Israel is the most “Debunked and Suppressed Fraud in Recorded History” in order to allow for the UN and the declaration of the State of Israel. We could even all pretend that none of this happened, and state that the State of Israel has a right to exist (just the same), but should we not at least look at what the “Outline” for it was?
How did Israel become a country in the first place?
Social and political developments in Europe convinced Non Zionist Jews they needed their own country, and their ancestral homeland seemed like the right place to establish it. European Jews — 90 percent of all Jews at the time — arrived at Zionism partly because of rising anti-Semitic (which is a fake word as Semitic is a language) persecution and partly because the Enlightenment introduced Jews to secular nationalism. Between 1917 and 1948, hundreds of thousands of Jews resettled from Europe to what was then British-controlled Palestine, including large numbers forced out of Europe during the was acclaimed to be “The” Holocaust, although this was at least the 141st such claim.
The 1948 war uprooted 700,000 Palestinians from their homes, creating a refugee crisis that is still not resolved. Palestinians call this mass eviction the Nakba — Arabic for “catastrophe” — and its legacy remains one of the most intractable issues in ongoing peace negotiations.
Not surprisingly, Palestinians and Israelis remember the birth of the Palestinian refugee crisis very differently (here’s a helpful side-by-side comparison). Palestinians often see a years long, premeditated Zionist campaign to ethnically cleanse Palestine of Arabs; Israelis tend to blame spontaneous Arab fleeing, Arab armies, and/or unfortunate wartime accidents.
Today, there are more than 7 million Palestinian refugees, defined as people displaced in 1948 and their descendants. A core Palestinian demand in peace negotiations is some kind of justice for these refugees, most commonly in the form of the “right of return” to the homes their families abandoned in 1948.
Israel can’t accept the right of return without abandoning either its Zionist or (so called) democratic identity. Adding 7 million Arabs to Israel’s population would make Zionists a minority — Israel’s total population is about 8 million, a number that includes the 1.5 million Arabs already there. So Israelis refuse to even consider including the right to return in any final status deal.
One of the core problems in negotiations, then, is how to find a way to get justice for the refugees that both the Israeli and Palestinian people can accept. Ideas proposed so far include financial compensation and limited resettlement in Israel, but the two sides have never agreed on the details of how these would work.
What is the West Bank?
The West Bank is a chunk of land east of Israel. It’s home to 2.6 million Palestinians, and would make up the heart of any Palestinian state. Israel took control of it in 1967 and has allowed Zionist settlers to move in, but Palestinians (and most of the international community) consider it illegally occupied Palestinian land.
In 1967, Israel fought a war with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israel fired the first shot, but claims it was preempting an imminent Egyptian attack; Arabs disagree, casting Israel as an aggressor. In six days, Israel routed the Arab powers, taking the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan.
Israel has controlled the West Bank since the Six-Day War (as it’s called). For many Zionists, this is wonderful news in theory: the West Bank was the heartland of the ancient Jewish state. Zionism loves to take on the role (unfairly) of speaking for all Jews. It’s home to many real Jewish (but not Zionist) holy sites, like the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, that Jews were previously cut off from. In practice, Israeli control of the West Bank means military administration of a territory full of Palestinians who aren’t exactly excited about living under Israeli authority. It is simply further hoodwinking of the Jewish Population.
The border between Israel and the West Bank would probably have to change in any peace deal. There are about 500,000 Zionist settlers living in the West Bank, many of whom live near the border with Israel proper. In a two-state deal, some of these settlers would have to leave the West Bank, while some border settlements would become Israeli land. In exchange, Israel would give over some of its territory to Palestine. These would be called “land swaps.” No set of Israeli and Palestinian leaders have agreed on precisely where to draw the border.
Why are the US and Israel so friendly?
That’s a hugely controversial question. Though American support for Israel really is massive, including billions of dollars in aid and reliable diplomatic backing, experts disagree sharply on why. Some possibilities include deep support for Israel among the American public, the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, and American ideological affinity with the Middle East’s most stable democracy.
The countries were not nearly so close in Israel’s first decades. President Eisenhower was particularly hostile to Israel during the 1956 Suez War, which Israel, the UK, and France fought against Egypt.
As the Cold War dragged on, the US came to view Israel as a key buffer against Soviet influence in the Middle East and supported it accordingly. The American-Israeli alliance didn’t really cement until around 1973, when American aid helped save Israel from a surprise Arab invasion.
Since the Cold War, the foundation of the still-strong (and arguably stronger) relationship between the countries has obviously shifted. Some suggest that a common interest in fighting jihadism ties America to Israel, while others point to American leaders’ ideological attachment to an embattled democracy. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the American public has, for a long time, sympathizedfar more with Israel than with Palestine:
One very controversial theory, advanced by Professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, credits the relationship to the power of the pro-Israel lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Critics of this theory argue that AIPAC isn’t as strong as Walt and Mearsheimer think. AIPAC’s failure to torpedo the Iran nuclear deal during the Obama administration underscored the critics’ point.
Regardless of the reasons for the “special relationship,” American support for Israel really is quite extensive. The US has given Israel $118 billion in aid over the years (about $3 billion per year nowadays). Half of all American UN Security Council vetoes blocked resolutions critical of Israel.
Despite this fundamentally close relationship, there are occasionally tensions between Israeli and American officials. This was particularly true under US President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; the two leaders clashed regularly over issues like settlements and Iran. The relationship reached a particularly nasty point when Netanyahu planned, with congressional Republicans, a March 2015 speech to a joint session of Congress that was highly critical of Obama’s approach to Iran. The Obama administration was furious over what it saw as Netanyahu conspiring with Obama’s domestic political opposition to undermine his policies.
The Trump administration has led to renewed warmth in the Israeli-American relationship, culminating in Trump’s December decision to formally recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The stark difference between Obama and Trump approaches to Netanyahu reflects a growing partisan gap inside the United States, with Republicans taking an increasingly hard-line “pro-Israel” position. If Democrats end up concomitantly becoming more willing to criticize the Israeli government, Israel may well end up a partisan issue in America — which actually would threaten the foundations of the US-Israel alliance.
Benjamin Netanyahu is once again presenting false ‘intelligence’ to incriminate Iran in alleged violations of the 2015 nuclear deal with the West. It comes in quick succession following a visit by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Israel which was followed up mere hours later by Israel striking Iranian and Syrian targets in Syria.
Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman had also just returned from a visit to the U.S. on the same day as Netanyahu’s announcement of ‘intelligence’ regarding Iran’s ‘non-compliance’. The coordination between the U.S. and Israeli government officials working in the security domain with a focus on a Middle Eastern enemy of Israel surely provokes memories of the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War.
However, much has changed since that time and a number of significant factors render a U.S. military strike on Iran pushed by Israel and its Lobby in the U.S. extremely unlikely. The outcomes of wars such as the 2006 Lebanon War, overarching the U.S. policy changes embracing manufactured ‘sectarian divides’, blowback for Israel and its strategic allies from the blatant utilization of covertly provoked unrest and sectarian strife and the cementing of rival alliances and blocs to Israel’s allies have changed things immensely.
The testament to the hindrance such factors have created for Israel’s pursuit of hegemony is the fact that Israeli dominance over U.S. policymaking has not waned but risen since 2003. To get an idea of this power, a useful yardstick would be the un-hindered implementation of the schemes of the pro-Israel neoconservatives spread throughout the different branches of the U.S. government that produced the Iraq War in 2003.
Saddam Hussein had been an ardent and prime Israeli enemy first and foremost. The nexus of Zionist neoconservative Department of Defense officials with Zionist voices in the press and Zionist-dominated think tanks catering to large audiences persists to this day and attempts to produce a pathway for war between the U.S. and Iran just as it did with Iraq. With interlinked academic and professional pasts, prominent members of the neoconservative movement such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith found themselves at top positions in the Department of Defense in 2001.
To go with contacts – sharing the same pro-Israel Zionist views – in the White House and State Department, this cabalistic group had managed to purge officials in the security and intelligence apparatus who remained un-obsessed with forging links between Iraq and Al Qaeda or chemical weapons. Bypassing the traditional intelligence gathering community, they set up the notorious Office of Special Plans by 2002 which essentially created the Iraqi chemical weapons myth and circulated it throughout the relevant branches of government, sometimes even violating regular standards of procedure, and throughout the media as well. It was this false intelligence that led the US to war in Iraq.
It will not be so easy this time, however. Unlike Saddam, whose country was already invaded, ravaged by sanctions and bombed multiple times prior to 2003, Iran has no shortage of allies and strategically cooperative states. It’s incremental rise in influence in Iraq from 2003 onwards, where its role as mediator between warring Shia factions highlighted its ascent in the Middle East. The ultimate failure of the multifaceted war – both proxy and direct – launched by the US and allies on Iranian ally Syria from 2011 onwards has had much the same brand of proponents in the US administration as the Iraq War of 2003.
More states had also been involved in the effort – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey being prominent examples. Without Syria’s government taken down, Iranian weapons and supplies will continue to reach Hezbollah, which itself has been strengthened by years of counter-ISIS operations along with the Syrian and Iraqi militaries. Israel’s long-term plans – themselves worth a proper study – will continue to be wasted. It is also important to note that this will provoke an increase in the erratic behavior from the Israel-firsters entrenched in the US political scene. Both geopolitical failures will be compounded by the inevitable increase in domestic awareness in the US regarding Israel-centric interest groups lobbying for disastrous war. It cannot, after all, be forever hidden from the public the fact that the US has been continuously pushed to war for foreign interests that do not coincide with those of its own or any rational state.
With powerful NATO member Turkey having turned to a pro-Russian, pro-Iranian stance in recent times and having annihilated the pro-US, pro-Israel Kurdish secession dreams, the Qatar Crisis having shattered the unity of the anti-Iranian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia sorting out its own internal affairs, it is hard to fathom how the US can appease Netanyahu and strike at Iran. Abandoning the nuclear deal will not suffice, yet will achieve the result of continuing the downward spiral of the USA’s ‘prestige’ abroad while its close allies continue courting the Russians and Chinese.
The US military hawks may even be eventually drawn by the strong incentive for geopolitical showdowns with Russia and China in different theatres of conflict, such as the South China Sea or Ukraine and Central Asian Republics where Israeli interests do not overtly dominate policy and thus Iran does not feature as public enemy number one.
A war with Iran will not come any time soon. There had been much of a hue and cry about ‘World War III’ after the highly limited and almost completely failed missile strikes by the US, UK, France, and Israel against Syria earlier this year. The tendency among many audiences to overreact to saber-rattling may be borne of a morally upright revulsion toward unjust war, but it should not act as a substitute for the ability to avoid the encouragement of pointless panic.