After wandering aimlessly for centuries, waves of Jewish Semites who had fled north from Palestine following the Roman-Jewish Wars and Diaspora of 70 AD, finally reached southern Russia around the beginning of the 7th Century. At the precise time of their arrival, the Khazar king was looking for a religion to adopt as the formal Khazar belief: Judaism was decided upon.
This did not represent a radical racial sea change for the Semitic Jews — they, like virtually all the peoples who inhabited the Middle East over the previous centuries, were themselves mixes of original Old European, Semitic, Arabic and Asian peoples. The Khazars themselves were not that different, perhaps a little lighter than the original Semites, but that was all. In this way, the core of what was to become the European Jews was formed — the basis of the Ashkenazim.
“Revisionism and Zionism”
Even before their conversion to Judaism, the Khazars, like the Huns and other Asiatics, were active slave traders. The Slavs, however, bore the brunt of the Khazar slave catching expeditions — so much so that the word slave was to derive from the word Slav — and with the Khazar conversion to Judaism, an association of Judaism with the slave trade in the east became firmly established. This was the origin of the association of Jews with slave trading — an allegation which had some basis in fact at this stage in history.
“Khazaria, a conglomerate of Aryan Turkish tribes, was finally wiped out by the forces of Genghis Han, but evidence indicates that the Khazars themselves migrated to Poland and formed the cradle of Western (Ashkenazim) Jewry…”
Zionists own your Media, so you only hear “Holocaust” when it is a fantasy “against them” which they want you to believe.
Readers acquainted with recent history and controversies win, with only one exception, find that these essays deal with generally familiar matters. The exception is the contribution of lawyer Eric Delcroix, which requires some acquaintance with the French legal system.
Cohn-Bendit, self-described “Jew of the extreme left,” seems most astonished at his present position, as he used to use, against the revisionists, “all the responses that are made to (him) today.” Worse, today he is strange bedfellow to “people of the right, even fascist types … and this situation is to (him) insupportable. ” However he holds up under the pressure-and realizes past sins: “I helped myself to democratic principles for my right of expression and found all sorts of good arguments to justify the prohibition of other ideas.” In the Faurisson affair, he has seen particularly impressive demonstrations of the fact that formal prohibition is not the only form of effective censorship, and that there is also the form that buries issues by declining to meet them directly and instead attacks the supposed motivations and consequences associated with a given thesis. Despite all this, he still considers himself “a convinced ‘exterminationist’,”but not a believer in the gas chambers; he compares Hitlees anti-Jewish policy to past Indian policies in the U.S.A., Armenian policies in Turkey, and Tatar policies of Stalin.
I should remark, parenthetically, that the word “exterminationist” means, in this context, “one who believes in the extermination of the Jews at the hands of the Germans during WW II.” Sometimes it more narrowly designates a prominent promoter of the extermination legend, e.g. Hilberg, Dawidowicz, Wiesenthal, or Poliakov. It is a strange term, but it seems to have caught on.
Monteil’s essay is a refutation of the judgment against Faurisson of 8 July 1981 (translations of passages from some of these judgments appeared in Patterns of Prejudice, October 1981). The court, after recognizing that it has “neither the quality nor the competence to judge history (and has) not been charged by law with a mission to decide how this or that episode of national or world history must be represented,” proceeded to do just that, e.g. “Faurisson has fixed his attention, in an almost exclusive fashion, on one of the means of extermination of which the reality has been established since the end of WW II and the discovery of the concentration camp system.” Monteil raises more or less routine points against such doublethink and then indicates imminent agreement with Faurisson:
Until 1978 1 believed in the general existence (or pretty much so) of the gas chambers in the camps, while having reservations on the unverifiable and surely excessive number of Jewish victims of the “Holocaust”. It suffices to cite my book (unlocatable, by reason of the obstruction of the “Hachette octopus” which “strangled” Guy Authier, my publisher) — Dossier secret sur Israel: le terrorisme (Paris, March 1978) -to see what my position was then. But since then I have read and met Robert Faurisson: his earnestness and his good faith have convinced me, even if certain judgments appear disputable to me, that it is justifiably urgent to discuss them calmly, in place of heaping onto an honest and courageous investigator the anathema reserved to heretics!
Tristani, a social scientist at the Sorbonne, with degrees in theology and philosophy, finds a striking religious character in the whole affair. Such an idea should not be new to a student of this subject. Indeed, I have discussed (Hoax, 188f) the remarkable parallels between the “war crimes trials” and the witchcraft trials of centuries ago, and found those parallels far more convincing than parallels that could be drawn between the war crimes trials and earlier narrowly politically motivated trials. However, Tristani’s point of departure is different:
The Holocaust, which represents one of the most popular themes of contemporary Judaism, thus falls into a long tradition. It is bound up with what it would be necessary to call the “invention of Israel,” of the Israel of today. The Hitlerian genocide perpetrated in the gas chambers, the Exodus and the creation of the Israeli state, do they not attain in effect the lofty meaning which the servitude in Egypt, the Exodus, and the installation in the Promised Land once had?
Tristan finds fault with the revisionists for apparently ignoring such matters:
Would not the “frivolity” reproached to Faurisson consist rather in having underestimated the importance of this religious function which the accounts of the gas chambers and the genocide have acquired? Moreover the same question holds for Serge Thion because, from the anthropological point of view where it becomes indispensable to place oneself to understand this affair, the primary alternative is not between historical truth and political truth but between historical and religious truth.
To this, I must comment that such a criticism of Faurisson holds at best only in relation to his published writings. He and I have long been generally aware of the relationships that Tristani calls attention to. We discussed the matter at length in 1980 when he was in the U.S.A. His attitude on the subject was far from frivolous, as he saw this secularized religious hysteria as bringing the whole world down on him. I can say that my failure, and perhaps also Faurisson’s failure, to expound publicly on such matters is based on certain personal limitations, self or otherwise imposed, on the sorts of things considered manageable in terms of investigation and public discourse. I am happy to see that there are now authors, such as Tristani, who wish to tread this ground, as it is as interesting as it is treacherous, and I look forward to furthering developments.
The longest and, I would say, a most representative essay in this book is Karnoouh’s. Its major function is to interpret the “Holocaust” controversy from a point of view that is both leftist and friendly to Faurisson. Following the strange leftist practice of describing the millennial assertive, repressive and exploitive strivings of states as somehow partaking especially of the spirit of the recent, short-lived and relatively benign (in comparison to its contemporaries) Mussolini movement, Karnoouh finds that
present day fascism has taken other faces, under the American tutelage; it has invaded the Third World (as witness) Somoza’s Nicaragua, Stroesner’s Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Indonesia … western Europe no longer needs concentration camps on its territories; it has displaced them elsewhere, where the reproduction of capital is facilitated with the aid of slave labor … and Israel hardly deprives itself of this facility …
For Karnoouh Israel fits into such a world very comfortably since “Zionism is also a national and socialist European ideology”, i.e. it was developed in Europe contemporaneously with the other nationalist, socialist and racist ideologies that we are acquainted with by direct experience, and it grew to political consequence in the same epoch. Thus
The slow and irresistible displacement of Israel toward the American camp is also quite comprehensible if account is taken of the power … of the American Jewish community. And, without wishing to establish too simplistic a comparison, it is not insignificant (that) the Jewish state seems to play the role of custodian watching over the Mideast for the sake of American Imperialism.
Now the visibility of such relationships could put Israel and the Diaspora Jews into a defensive position perilous enough to cause the latter to entertain serious questions on the wisdom of supporting the Zionist enterprise. In Karnoouh’s view, the “Holocaust” provides the necessary binding:
… The nation-state has always had need of these simplified representations of history … in order to turn popular and collective emotions to its profit.
Only a religious or mythical version of the deportation and massacre of the Jews, the “Holocaust,” can assume this role because it simplifies history and transforms the contradictions and quite complex political, ideological and economic conflicts into a Manichean saga which expresses the eternal struggle between Good and Evil, the “Goy” and the Jew, the German and the Jew, the Arab and the Jew.
This sort of formulation must be expected from a leftist source but, in any case, there is much truth in it. Among the many reservations I have, it is worthwhile to mention two particularly important ones. First, Israel does not represent or guard American interests in the Mideast. The relationship is the reverse and to the American disadvantage. For another thing, I believe it is misleading to view the basic role of the “Holocaust” propaganda in terms of its effect on Jews. While the propaganda doubtless has the unifying effect among Jews that Karnoouh notes, it is paraded loudly and massively before predominantly gentile audiences, and its function should be considered in this light. Indeed the especially massive propaganda of approximately the past five years is not a response to any weakening of links between Israel and the Diaspora. If I may risk a charge of immodesty, it seems to me that it is a response to the revisionists.
Karnoouh seems to get some things backward when they relate directly to Jews, and that brings us to the secondary role of his essay. Karnoouh is of Jewish ancestry but does not consider himself Jewish. However, even that view, when expressed in his writing, reveals the existence of a “Jewish question.”
Can I today define myself in all sincerity as a Jew? A delicate question, (and to) the defense lawyer who asked it I answered: “For the anti-semites and racists, I am a Jew, for other men I am simply a man who belongs to the French culture.” This affirmation earned me the hatred of not only the xenophobic spectators but also that of certain of my friends, among the most tolerant, who considered the sentiment a betrayal on my part. In a few seconds, I had become a renegade who abandoned his own in the moment of “the danger.” But does one have the right to associate me with an identity which does not relate to my experience and which, consequently, is more or less exterior to my consciousness?
This view is both refreshingly rational and disturbingly paradoxical for, after all, Karnoouh has now given us a long and carefully considered essay in which his Jewish background is certainly not “exterior to (his) consciousness.” How does one resolve the apparent cohabitation of reason and paradox in Karnoouh’s views? If there is a way, many would be very interested to learn it, for we are here confronted not with a mere transient “problem” but with the quite subsistent and indeed robust “Jewish question.” This cannot be a revelation to Pierre Guillaume and Editions de la Différence for they have issued, almost simultaneously, a new printing of Bernard Lazare’s 1894 classic, L’Antisémitisme, son histoire et ses causes.
In summary, Intolérable Intolérance is an uneven book. It ranges from the trite, through the engaging, to the provocative. It is nevertheless a very important book, despite or even because of the nature of its shortcomings, and we must thank the authors and publishers for making it available. Its importance derives not only from new insights that it offers but also from its posing of challenging questions in an area of social relations in which thought has been in a state of suspension and controversy in a state of evasion for several decades at least. As its points of departure are not esoteric historical questions but current controversies, it is just the sort of book that can set into operation critical faculties that have been accumulating dust and even rust in this period of “suspension” of thought. It is hoped that an English translation will appear.
I should add a note on the availability, to the U.S. reader, of the books reviewed here. Intolérable Intolérance can be obtained through an established dealer in foreign books, via his special order. Mémoire en Défense, however, should be ordered directly from La Vieille Taupe in Paris. That is also the case for Thion’s Vérité Historique ou Vérité Politique?, as the distributor mentioned in my earlier review of that book is no longer handling it.
I close with a partial report on Faurisson’s litigations. The most serious dangers that his enemies raised for him were based on a statement he made in an interview on French TV on 17 December 1980:
The historical he has permitted a gigantic political-financial swindle, whose principal beneficiaries are the state of Israel and international Zionism, and whose principal victims are the German people, but not their leaders, and the whole of the Palestinian people.
For this, he was charged with defamation of the Jewish people (group libel) and incitement to racial hatred. Found guilty of both, he was ordered to pay damages and fines totaling 21,000 francs, given a three-month prison sentence (suspended) and, most important, ordered to pay for the reproduction of the judgment in four publications and over national TV (Le Monde, 5-6 July 1981). The last requirement involved a sum of about half a million dollars and was well beyond his means. The situation looked particularly ominous as there is no law of personal bankruptcy in France (only a business can go bankrupt there).
His appeal against this ruling, announced 23 June 1982, brought success for him on this gravest part of the judgment, and his conviction for incitement to racial hatred was overturned. However, the charge of defamation of the Jewish people was sustained, as were the fines, damages, and suspended prison sentence (Le Monde, 26 June 1982).
Faurisson’s supporters breathed a sigh of relief over the important successful part of the appeal outcome. That which has been left standing is nevertheless a moral and intellectual outrage. In an age in which virtually all sectors of public opinion have proclaimed their devotion to “freedom” with the persistence of an absent-minded devout who has lost count of his Hail Marys, a professor is being punished for announcing the politically unpopular conclusions of his research. This observation would hold even if Faurisson had been victorious in the first instances in all his trials. The professional and international yappers for “freedom,” whom we hear so often, have with only scattered and isolated exceptions either pretended that they never heard of Faurisson, or found rationalizations to excuse his persecution. This fact is almost not worth mentioning, because the hypocrisy referred to is all too familiar.